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INTRODUCTION

"One of the most interesting developments in American higher
education over the past decade has been the emerging recognition
by lawyers that an understanding of elementary economic principles is a vital component in their professional equipment."1 Contributing to this recognition has been the growing awareness by the
legal profession that rules of law promulgated by the legislature
and ruled upon by the judiciary have, as their underlying foundation, economic theories well settled in the economic sphere of
thought. Economic models and theories are manifestations of social attitudes and moral values of society and, therefore, play an
important role in shaping general principles of law. Consequently,
an understanding of economic theory can help explain the basic
rationale underlying judicial and legislative decisions. The three
economic theories having the greatest influence on American jurisprudence have been the Classical, Keynesian, and Institutional
philosophies. The purpose of this article is to examine the impact
of these major economic theories on judicial and political decisions.
By examining legal decisions from an economic point of view, we
can gain greater understanding of the reasons behind legal decisions in the past and present, as well as gaining the insights necessary to predict more accurately the path of the law in the future.
II.

CLASsicAL ECONOMICS

A. Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations"
Generally speaking, the birth of modern economics followed the
publication in 1776 of Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.2 In this monumental work
1. Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60
2. A. SMrrH,

VA.

L. REv. 483, 483 (1974).

AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
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Adam Smith attempted to extend the earlier defined natural laws
of science and politics to economics. He was particularly impressed
with John Locke's argument that the state should serve only to
support natural laws and that within this structure individuals
should have free play. Smith's argument was that if business were
left to its own devices it would achieve a system responsive to natural economic laws and hence one that worked for the mutual benefit of all. This theoretical construct was premised on two assumptions: first, man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, and,
therefore, if left on his own will be the best judge of his self-interests and maximize them;' and second, the welfare of society is the
sum of all these individual welfares.
Smith viewed his theory of "self-interest" as the manifestation
of an exchange for value, with that received being more valuable to
the recipient than what he actually gave up for it. According to
Smith, this uncompromising effort on the part of each individual
to improve his own personal welfare would lead, as though impelled by an "invisible hand," to a maximization of the public good
in the long run. In the Wealth of Nations he stated:
Every individual . .. endeavors as much as he can both to employ

his capital in the support of domestic industry and so to direct that
industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of thb society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in

such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases,
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention. Nor is it always the worst for the society that it was no
part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that
of the society more effectively than when he really intends to promote it.4

(1937).
3. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 (1972). "Self-interest should not be

confused with selfishness; the welfare of other people may be part of one's satisfactions." Id.
at 1.
4. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423
(1937) (emphasis added).
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Thus, Smith considered the market a regulatory system constituting an institution of social control.5 The "invisible hand" controls individual conflict and excesses in competition while safeguarding the public good through healthy competition.' In other
words, individual self-interest will guide resources to proper
usage.7
The Wealth of Nations sets forth, therefore, a social theory of
market capitalism envisioning a social organization in which the
market constitutes the principal mechanism coordinating and controlling economic activity. 8 In this Classical economic system the
government is assigned a limited role. It assists the free enterprise
market system by maintaining justice, furnishing a national defense, erecting public works, and providing those institutions too
complex or costly for individuals to create. In effect, it is assigned
to the role of the referee.
The Classical theory of business freedom and governmental restraint dominated the world of economic thought until the Great
Depression. In the United States the thoughts of John Locke and
Adam Smith moved the pens of the founding fathers to write of
the God-given rights to life, liberty, and property. Such rights existed beyond man's power to alter them, and the state was merely
a device to protect such rights, never to create, diminish, or redefine them.
B. Laissez-Faire Capitalism
1. The Rise of Social Darwinism. One of the grandest state5. Samuels, The Political Economy of Adam Smith, 15 NEB. J. ECON. & Bus. 3, 11
(1976).
6. Id.at 11.
7. See Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-InvisibleHand, 17 J. L. & ECON.
461, 461 (1974).
8. Stanfield, Institutional Economics and the Crisis of Capitalism, 11 J. EcoN. Issus
449, 450 (1977). With self-interest the impelling force of the economic machine, Adam
Smith envisioned a tidy mechanism of self-adjusting markets where each proffered item had
a natural price based on the cost of production and adjusted to public demand. Should the
quantity of a given product exceed the demand of the purchasing public, then its price must
fall. When the demand exceeds the sum of goods available the price would rise, and, drawn
by rising prices, more producers would compete for the sale. Once more the supply would
become excessive, and prices would fall in a natural harmonic rhythm. In this way the market would retain a basic self-regulating equilibrium for the greatest social good.
9. See Gruchy, Law, Politics, and Institutional Economics, 7 J. EcoN. IssuEs 623, 628
(1973).
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ments of the laws of human progress during the 19th century was
the Synthetic Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, published between
1860 and 1896.10 What Herbert Spencer attempted to do was to
turn Charles Darwin's theory of evolution into a social philosophy.
In society, as in nature, according to this theory, the weak were
weeded out and the fittest survived. Thus, the less vigorous social
institutions, as well as the less gifted humans, perished in the
struggle. "Social Darwinism" became a common, tough-minded approach to issues of human progress.11 In the United States support
for the laissez-faire position was justified by this newly promulgated theory of social evolution. 12 In this way, Adam Smith's universe was infused with the law of the jungle. The market place, it
was argued, provided the true test for the survival of the fittest.18
Poverty, corruption, laziness, and ignorance could be eliminated
only by centuries of evolution. To tempt with free competition, to
hand out charity to the unfit, was to mar the operation of the machinery that God in eons past had set spinning.
2. The Rise of the Robber Barons. Adam Smith's philosophy,
combined with Social Darwinism, ultimately led to great increases
in raw power which were manifested in the robber barons. These
were rugged, individualistic business tycoons who looked on the
growth of large business as, in John D. Rockefeller's words,
"merely a survival of the fittest . . . the working out of a law of
14
nature and a law of God."
Herbert Spencer argues that powerful business leaders and industrialists of the era had attained their powerful positions by
emerging at the top in the struggle for survival.1 5 Businessmen had
to be left alone to "fight it out among themselves"' 6 for
10. See generally M. CHAMBERS, R. GREw,
WESTERN EXPERIENCE SINCE 1640 (1974).

D. HERLIHY, T. RABB, & I. WOLACH, THE

11. Id. at 902.
12. Fletcher, Lawyers, Economists, and Laissez-Faire, 16 NEB. J. ECON. & Bus. 19, 31
(1977). In the United States Spencer's foremost advocate was Yale University economist
William Graham Sumner. See generally Bannister, William Graham Sumner's Social Darwinism: A Reconsideration, 5 HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 89 (1973).
13. M. CHAMBERS, R. GRww, D. HERLIHY, T. RABB, & I. WOLACH, THE WESTERN EXPERIENCE SINCE 1640, at 902 (1974).
14. See Fletcher, Lawyers, Economists, and Laissez-Faire, 16 NEB. J. ECON. & Bus. 19,
32 (1977).

15. Id. at 31-32.
16. Id. at 32.
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"[i]ntervention in behalf of the weak and unsuccessful could only
serve to reduce the rate of economic"17 and social progress. Moreover, if business success was proof of progress, greater success in
business represented greater progress. 1 ' This theory provided justification for the robber barons' acquisition of power and wealth.
The most unscrupulous tycoon of this conscienceless age was Jay
Gould. Gould launched on a ceaseless quest for economic power, an
undertaking undeterred by sentiment, conscience, patriotism, justice, piety, pity, or the desire for admiration.
Perhaps best known of the robber barons was John D. Rockefeller who in the 1870's built an empire that completely controlled
the domestic oil industry and owned substantial foreign oil interests. 1 ' Another famous robber baron was Andrew Carnegie who
cornered the steel market, aggregating 180 companies into United
States Steel.' 0 At a time when the United States had no income
tax, no social security, no unemployment insurance, no workers
compensation, and the average American worker earned less than
$500 annually, Carnegie had a personal income of $23 million. 1
The American economy, characterized until about 1870 by the individual entrepreneurship of small artisans and family farms, was
so transformed by this era that by 1900 the economy was dominated by great aggregations of capital controlled by trusts or corporations.2 2 Under the Classical dogma of Adam Smith, these giant
corporations demanded absolute freedom from all restrictions except those imposed by the market place. With the natural law theories of John Locke and Adam Smith exerting a pervasive influence on American jurisprudential thought, the courts did not
hesitate, in most cases, to clear the way for these corporate
giants.23
17. Id. at 32.
18. Id. at 32.
19. Dorsey, Free Enterprisevs. The Entrepreneur:Redefining the Entities Subject to
the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 1244, 1259 (1977). See generally R. HiDy & M. HIDY,
PIONEERING IN BIo BusiNEss 1882-1911, at 24-32 (1955).
20. Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. The Entrepreneur:Redefining the Entities Subject
to
the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1244, 1256 (1977).
21. Id. at 1256.
22. See Kristol, On Corporate Capitalism in America, in THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 124, 126 (1976).
23. See Fletcher, Lawyers, Economists, and Laissez-Faire, 16 NEE. J. ECON. & Bus. 19,
31-32 (1977).
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In 1873 the Supreme Court decided the famous SlaughterHouse Cases24 in which it ruled that a state could preclude an individual from engaging in a particular business without violating
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.2 5 In his dissent to
this opinion, Justice Bradley set forth a rationale that would eventually become the law of the land.
Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to
rights of life, liberty, and property. These are fundamental rights
which can only be taken away by due process of law ....
For the preservation, exercise, and enjoyment of these rights the
individual citizen, as a necessity, must be left free to adopt such
calling, profession, or trade as may seem to him most conducive to
that end. Without this right he cannot be a freeman. This right to
choose one's calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the
object of government to 2protect;
and a calling, when chosen, is a
6
man's property and right.

"In the ensuing years the Supreme Court moved toward, and in
1897 adopted, the Bradley position,' 27 in Allgeyer v. Louisiana: 28
The liberty mentioned in the fourteenth amendment means not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person ... but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to
use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned. 29
In Allgeyer, therefore, the Supreme Court completed a full circle
and incorporated "Lockean materialistic individualism into the
24. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
25. Dorsey, Free Enterprisevs. The Entrepreneur:Redefining the Entities Subject to
the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1244, 1253 (1977); see Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80-81 (1873).
26. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting);
see Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. The Entrepreneur:Redefining the Entities Subject to the
Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1244, 1253 (1977).
27. Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. The Entrepreneur:Redefining the Entities Subject to
the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. Riv. 1244, 1253 (1977).
28. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
29. Id. at 589.
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due process clause" of the fourteenth amendment.80
Although the courts during this era clearly favored the doctrine
of laissez-faire, thus perpetuating the interests of big business, the
American public began demanding a more active policy of government intervention. The passage of the Sherman (Antitrust) Act
of 18901" was a direct congressional response to this mounting public pressure. The avowed purpose of the Sherman Act was to respond to "the inequality of condition, of wealth, and opportunity
that has grown within a single generation out of the concentration
of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade
and to break down competition."' An early challenge to8 4this new
act was presented in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.
3. Laissez-Faire and Antitrust: The Standard Oil Case. The
powerful combination of companies put together by Rockefeller"
in the 1870's was organized into a holding company in 1899, the
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.86 The activities of this combination, prior and subsequent to the incorporation, were attacked
by the government as an unlawful conspiracy to monopolize and
restrain trade under the Sherman Act.8 7 The combination obtained
control of 90 percent of the business of producing, shipping, refining, and selling petroleum and its products.' In 1911 Standard Oil
employed 70,000 persons, had $860 million in total assets, and $95
million in earnings.89
The government won its case against Standard Oil and, as a re30. Dorsey, Free Enterprisevs. The Entrepreneur:Redefining the Entities Subject to
the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1244, 1253 (1977).
31. See Fletcher, Lawyers, Economists, and Laissez-Faire, 16 NEB. J. EcoN. & Bus. 19,
32 (1977).
32. Ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209-10 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
33. 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman), quoted in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 n.1 (2d Cir. 1945); see Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. The Entrepreneur:Redefining the Entities Subject to the Antitrust Laws, 125 U.
PA. L. REV. 1244, 1246 (1977).
34. 221 U.S. 1, 47, 64-65 (1911).
35. See Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. The Entrepreneur: Redefining the Entities Subject to the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 1244, 1259 (1977).
36. Id. at 1259.
37. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 41 (1911).
38. See id. at 41; Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. The Entrepreneur:Redefining the Entities Subject to the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. RaV. 1244, 1259 (1977).
39. See Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. the Entrepreneur:Redefining the Entities Subject
to the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1244, 1259 (1977).
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suit, the combination was dissolved into thirty-eight companies.'
.Upon initial observation this result may seem at odds with the theory of laissez-faire which was pervasive in American society. In
fact, the case was well within the Classical economic model. Social
Darwinism was a deviation from Adam Smith's basic theory, and
Smith, a moral philosopher, 1 would have rejected it as an economic theory of progress. Under the Classical model, a "self-regulating market system . . . not only calls on the state to referee the
competitive game and keep intruders off the field, but also calls for
the government to provide a definite framework within which the
game is to be played.' 2 Accordingly, laissez-faire, meant not
"leave us alone," but "leave us alone except where you can help
us.' 43 The "invisible hand" of Classical economics is supposed to
control "excess of competition" and safeguard the public good
through healthy competition. 4 Since the ultimate interest of Standard Oil was to eliminate competition, the decision of the Supreme
Court was not only justified, but was called for under the Classical
model.
Antitrust legislation under the Classical theory, therefore, was
viewed as consistent with the role of government as "umpire" of
the free market system. Its goal, at the risk of oversimplification,
was to promote competition under the market economy.' 5 During
the progressive era of American history, the surge of business consolidation quickened anti-big-business sentiment and provided
support for antitrust enforcement. In this period, antitrust was in
high gear. 4' Laissez-faire was an institution in American economic

40. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 45-46, 81-82 (1911). Included
among the companies established by the dissolution are such giants as Exxon amd Mobil.
See Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. The Entrepreneur:Redefining the Entities Subject to the
Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1244, 1259 (1977).
41. See generally Coase, Adam Smith's View of Man, 19 J. L. & ECON. 529 (1976);
Hutchinson, Adam Smith and the Wealth of Nations, 19 J. L. & ECON. 507 (1976).
42. Fletcher, Lawyers, Economists, and Laissez-Faire, 16 NEB. J. ECON. & Bus. 19, 25
(1977).
43. Id. at 27,
44. See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
45. See Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency,
What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1200 (1977); Sullivan, Economics and More
Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 1214, 1214-15 (1977).
46. See generally Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS
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thought, however, and by the First World War antitrust enforcement was at a minimum. The 1920's were a time in which business
and businessmen were held in high esteem and the political leadership of the country was conservative. The anti-business sentiment
of the progressive era had passed, and it was not until 1937 that
antitrust enforcement was once again revived. 7
C.

Classical Market Failures

The fundamental principle of Classical economics is that people
will pursue their own self-interest.4 8 The basic policy premise of
Classical economists is that so long as "market failures" do not
arise, this self-interest, like an invisible hand, will guide resources
to their proper usage." Market failures do arise, however, and they
represent the most important justification for government regulation of the economy. Professor Stephen Breyer has enumerated a
number of important "classical market failures." 0 These defects
are classified by Professor Breyer as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Monopolization 1
Rent Control8"
Correction of Spillovers"
4
Correcting for Inadequate Information5

47. See generally id. at 188-237.
48. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OP LAW 1 (1972).

49. See Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J. L. &
EcoN. 461, 461 (1974).

50. Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives,
and Reform, 92 HARV. L. Rzv. 549, 553 (1979).
51. Id. at 553.
52. Rent control refers to sudden price increases that may allow those holding commodity interests to realize windfall profits. Id. at 554-55.
53. Id. at 555. Referring to this defect, Professor Breyer stated:
Regulation is frequently justified as needed to compensate for the fact that the price
of a product does not reflect certain major costs that its production and use impose
upon the economy. The price of steel does not reflect the spillover of external costs
that it imposes in the form of air pollution that harms or irritates those who live near
the plant. As a result, more steel may be demanded than is warranted in light of its
adverse side effects.
Id. at 555.
54. Before competitive markets can function effectively consumers must possess sufficient information to evaluate competing products. This supply information alone is an important commodity, reflecting both costs and demand. Government regulation is typically
intended to promote consumer awareness or reduce the cost of obtaining consumer information. See id. at 556.
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6.
7.

Excessive Competition"

Moral Hazard" 5

Rationalization

7

The Classical economic theory would deal with these defects in a
manner consistent with minimal government regulation. For example, antitrust would be employed to break up monopolies and control excessive competition." Additionally, the Classical economist
would argue many regulatory programs fail in their objectives and
create more severe problems.8 ' Consequently, proponents of Classical economics advocate deregulation upon the firm belief that the
market system itself can cure any market defects in time. For
those defects beyond the competence of the free market, government can intervene, in the limited capacity of referee, by enacting
legislation to remedy the specific market failure. 6°
55. "A commonly advanced justification for the regulation of airlines, trucks, and ships
is the need to control 'excessive competition.'" Id. at 556.
56. "The term 'Moral Hazard' is used to describe a situation in which someone other
than a buyer pays for the buyer's purchases." Id. at 557. ",The most obvious current example is escalating medical costs. As medical care is purchased to an ever greater extent by the
government or by large private insurers . . . the buyer will not feel any . . . pocketbook
constraint, and will purchase a good oblivious to the resource costs he imposes upon the
economy." Id. at 557-58. "When ethical or other institutional constraints or direct supervision by the payer fail to control purchases, government regulation may be demanded." Id. at
557.
57. Government intervention is sometimes necessary to help small firms in an industry
that would be unable otherwise to institute efficient production. Id. at 558.
58. See id. at 579.
59. See id. at 579-81.
60. See id. at 583. Professor Breyer argues that the merits of classical regulation can be
judged only after a comparison with the available alternatives. Deregulation is not the only
choice. Among the available alternative tools are unregulated markets policed by antitrust
legislation; disclosure regulations; taxes; market based incentives or allocations; bargaining;
changes in liability rules; and, nationalization. Id. at 578-84. Professor Breyer presents the
following solutions for certain market failures:
Problem

Tentative Solution

Natural Monopoly
Rent Control
Spillovers
Excessive Competition
Inadequate Information

Cost-of-service rate making
Taxes or deregulations
Taxes, market based incentives, bargaining
Deregulation (with antitrust enforcement)
Disclosure regulation

Id. at 603. Professor Breyer concludes that these solutions prevent mismatches of problems

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 11 [2022], No. 4, Art. 1

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:785

As might be perceived, the economic model of the Classical theory viewed market depressions as mere interruptions of progress.
The cataclysm of 1929, however, shook the very foundations of the
Classical theory." The deep depression which followed the market
crash of October 29, 1929, undermined the basic philosophy of a
free, unregulated market economy and "pushed the Keynesian
revolution to the forefront of economics." 6
III.
A.

KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS

The Great Depression

On October 29, 1929, historically known as Black Tuesday, the
bottom fell out of the stock market, forcing the United States into
economic collapse."
The market crash was bad enough in its own right; it brought
financial ruin to hundreds of thousands of people in the space of a
few panicky days in late October.
But the plunge in stock prices turned out to be only the first step
toward a catastrophe unlike anything the nation had endured
before-a business slump that was to be known forever afterward as
the Great Depression."
Between 1929 and 1933, the tremendous impact of the Great Depression was felt in every sector of the economy: residental construction dropped 95 percent; nine million savings accounts were
lost; real disposable income was sliced 28 percent; eighty-five thousand businesses failed; production fell more than half; and total
output of goods and services dropped by one third." In addition,
salaries dwindled 40 percent and dividends fell 56 percent. The
worst aspect of the depression, however, was the level of unemployment which rose from 1.6 million in 1929 to 12.8 million in
1933; by the lowest point of the depression one fourth of the labor
force was unemployed.6 Economists, faithfully adhering to the
with solutions while striving for "less restrictive alternatives." Id. at 603-04.

61. T.

COCHRAN, AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

112 (1972).

62. Peterson, Institutionalism,Keynes, and the Real World, 16 NEB. J. EcON. & Bus.
27, 27 (1977). See generally G. MYRDAL, AGAINST THE STEAM 3-4 (1973).
63. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 29, 1979, at 32.
64. Id. at 32.
65. Id. at 32.
66. Id. at 32.
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teachings of Adam Smith, could offer neither diagnosis nor remedy. The free market system simply was not dealing with the
problems facing the nation.
In response to the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes
published his General Theory 7 contending the Classical model
was invalid and providing a substitute analytical framework. 8 In
the General Theory, Keynes urged that government action would
promote equilibrium at the full employment output level.6 9 According to the Keynesian view, full employment and steady economic growth could be ensured only through active governmental
intervention.7 0 The government, eager to bring the economy
around, energetically accepted the new Keynesian economics and
"for the first time ever, Americans delegated economic manage71
ment to the federal government.
B.

The General Theory

The theoretical construct of the General Theory was, generally,
a justification for utilizing other practical anti-depression weapons,
such as public works financed by government deficit spending. According to Keynes, if business failed to invest enough to create reemployment, the government could take up the slack either by
more spending or by tax reductions leading to a deficit.7 2 Once a
sufficient reduction in unemployment was attained, the government could reduce expenditures and resume previous levels of activity."8 Fiscal policy, in other words, could provide the support
and control necessary for a stable economic system.
Keynes envisioned a society that was both economically just and
economically efficient.74 His "Agenda" for government proposed
that good government should not:
67. See J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
68. See id. at 3; Fletcher, Lawyers, Economists, and Laissez-Faire, 16 NEB. J. EPON. &
Bus. 19, 34 (1977).
69. Fletcher, Lawyers, Economists, and Laissez-Faire, 16 NEB. J. ECON. & Bus. 19, 34
(1977).
70. J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 12 (1973); see T. COCHRAN,
AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

118 (1972).

71. Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1979, at 18, col. 2.

72. See T.

COCHRAN, AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

118 (1972).

73. J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 24 (1973).
74. Johnson & Johnson, The Social and Intellectual Origins of The General Theory, in
6 HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 261, 264 (1974).
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attempt to do the things that private enterprise or semiautonomous
public bodies were doing well already, but [should] apply itself to
those things that were not being done at all. Here at different times
he proposed some far-reaching areas of government activity. . . . He
was careful, however, not to recommend measures that would dis-

courage business ....

71

The kinds of government spending Keynes preferred, therefore,
were those supporting projects of social utility, such as housing,
schools, hospitals, and parks. The ultimate objective of the General Theory, however, was the substitution of an activist government for the negative government of the Classical model.7 6 This
aspect of Keynes' theory was manifested in the New Deal program
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and subsequently enacted in
the Employment Act of 1946." The Employment Act, by assigning
to Washington the task of promoting maximum employment, production, and purchasing power, brought government in as an equal
participant in the managing of the economy. There is little doubt
that Keynes has emerged as the dominant economic figure of the
twentieth century, and his theories have profoundly influenced
contemporary thought about the economy and perception of the
economic process. 8 In this sense most of us may be referred to as
79
Keynesians.
C.

The Keynesian Society

The combined effects of the Great Depression and Keynes' new
economics resulted in an expansion of government analogous to the
growth of big business in the late 19th century. Keynes had envisioned a program of discretionary fiscal policy; the government
would step in when necessary to effectuate a reduction of unemployment, and then recede to its previous level of activity once full
employment was obtained.80 The government, however, expanded
75. Id. at 264.
76. Gruchy, Law, Politics, and Institutional Economics, 7 J. EcoN. ISSUES 623, 631
(1973).
77. Ch. 33, § 2, 60 Stat. 23 (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-1025 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1979)).
78. See Peterson, Institutionalism, Keynes, and the Real World, 16 NEB. J. ECON. &

Bus. 27, 38 (1977).
79. See id. at 38.
80. J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 24 (1973).
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beyond Keynes theoretical constructs and exerted pervasive influence over every facet of the economy. During the New Deal period,
for example, legislation was passed affecting the following areas of
the economy: industrial and trade regulation, credit extension,
banking, securities regulations, and. monetary regulations.8 1 The
government went beyond mere fiscal policy and entered the realm
of direct regulation of the market and business. Business was suddenly asked to forget its tradition of unquestioned pre-eminence
and to adopt a new philosophy of cooperation with labor unions,
acceptance of new rules and regulations, and reform of many of its
practices.
The result of the Keynesian economic philosophy, therefore, has
been government's expansion of its sphere of influence and encroachment upon the rights of individuals, business, and corporate
structures. By utilizing its political power, the government has established firm economic principles by which society is to be governed. The full implication of this is the fusion of political and
economic power to accomplish national goals, particularly, full employment, economic growth, and stable prices. Within this new economic system the judiciary has been assigned the role of "referee"
and empowered, within the confines of the Constitution, to render
economic decisions affecting the distribution of laws, goods, and
services. Keynesian economics, then, simultaneously assaulted orthodox economic theory, substituted a dazzling and novel theory of
employment and income, and supplanted that doctrine with a
whole series of public policies and regulations.
Keynes' General Theory was aimed at the specific problems facing the world during the Great Depression, namely, unemployment
and low levels of business investments. It provided a set of tools
for dealing with periods of business recessions. Keynes, however,
could not have foreseen the explosive growth of government and
its intrusion into every sector of the economy. The Keynesian philosophy, distorted by Washington, has resulted in a mass of bureaucratic regulations and agencies. The complex system
of regulation that has emerged, without any coherent plan, is estimated to
have cost $500 billion in 1978. New regulations with astounding
economic impact were developed, in many cases, without adequate
input from the parties most affected and without sufficient consid81. See generally COMMERCE

CLEARING HOUSE,
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eration of their future impact on the economy. The result has been
excessive and duplicative economic controls."2
Many of the regulations present today were developed during
the catastrophe of the early 1930's and were addressed to problems
no longer existing. The increase in regulation has been so rapid,
however, that no check system has been designed to scrap
outmoded or ineffective regulations. One of the best examples of
this problem is the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Q, which
sets a ceiling on the amount of interest a bank is allowed to pay its
customers on time and saving deposits.' 8 Between June 1929 and
June 1933, the number of banks declined 43 percent and total deposits fell 35 percent.' Excessive rate competition for deposits and
speculative investment policies were blamed for the thousands of
bank failures resulting during this period.5 The government responded with the Banking Act of 1933"6 which instructed the Federal Reserve to set rate ceilings on commercial banks.87 What followed was Regulation Q.8 There is almost general consensus today
that Regulation Q has outlived its usefulness."9 Federal deposit insurance and new supervisory practices have made bank failures extremely rare today.' 0 In addition, Regulation Q has had the effect
of restraining competition and discriminating against small
depositors. 1
82. Several bills have been introduced recently in Congress to deal with the problems of
regulatory proliferation. The aims of this "regulatory reform movement" are to improve
rulemaking procedures and the mechanism for review of current regulations. See Regulation
Reform Act of 1979, S. 755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; Reform of Federal Regulation Act of 1979,
S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Seas.; Administrative Practice Regulation Act of 1979, S. 262, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess.; Administrative Regulatory Control Act of 1979, S.1291, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess.; Regulatory Procedures Improvement Act of 1979, S. 93, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
83. Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. §§ 217 to 217.153 (1979) (revised and amended) (regulations concerning interest on deposits).
84. See Jacobs, The Framework of Commercial Bank Regulation: An Appraisal, 1
NAT'L BANKING REV. 343, 347 (1964).
85. L. RITrER & W. SILBER, MoYV 192 (2d ed. 1973).
86. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1976)).
87. See id. § 11(b).
88. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 217 to 217.153 (1979) (revised and amended).
89. See, e.g., Dunne, The Swan Song of Regulation Q, 91 BANING L.J. 819, 819 (1974);
Holmberg, Regulation Q and Consumer Protection: Legal and Economic Guidelines, 92
BANKING L.J. 1073, 1073 (1975); Verkuil, Perspectives on Reform of FinancialInstitutions,
83 YALE L.J. 1349, 1358 (1974).
90. See L. RIrER & W. SILBER, MoNEY 197 (2d ed. 1973).
91. See id. at 197-98. Since Regulation Q allows higher interest rates on larger deposits
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Keynesian economics has resulted in a highly regulated economy
perhaps not equipped to deal with present day problems. The
presence of stagflation must be as shocking to Keynesians as the
Great Depression was to the Classical economists." Keynes' theo-

ries, limited in time and function, therefore, are ill-equipped to
deal with the problems facing America today. Government regulations have become so detailed and pervasive that they have begun
to threaten the American free enterprise system.98
IV.

A.

INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

Conflict: The Analytical Framework

1. An Overview. Institutional economics is a school of thought
that receives its name from basic models that characterize eco-

nomic institutions and the structure of the United States' economy. The premise of the Institutionalist is that development in the
basic institutions of the American economy, such as the market,
corporations, and governmental structures, can substantially affect
functioning of the economy." These economists view economic institutions as part of a larger social structure in which all parts are
interrelated. Consequently, any meaningful inquiry into one por-

tion, such as the economy must be based on a pervasive general
theory of social structure or social organization." This is one of the
most fundamental principles of Institutional economics-even if
attention is focused on a specific problem, the analysis must take
into account the entire social system." Institutionalists are also
concerned with the distribution of power in society, and, more genit discriminates against the small, average depositor. Moreover, by setting what might be
termed draconian restrictions on the amount of interest that can be paid lawfully on deposits, it produces inefficient operations by precluding healthy competition. Two presidential
commissions have recognized these problems and have recommended interest rate deregulation. Regulation Q, however, still remains in full force. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION (1972) (Hunt Commission).
92. Stagflation refers to the phenomenon of inflation combined with abnormally slow
economic growth causing high unemployment.
93. Dorsey, Free Enterprisevs. The Entrepreneur:Redefining The Entities Subject to
the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1244, 1244 (1977).
94. See Tool, A Social Value Theory in Neoinstitutional Economics, 11 J. ECON. IsSUES 823, 841-42 (1977).

95. See Fusfeld, The Development of Economic Institutions, 11 J. EcoN. ISSUES 771,
773-74 (1978).
96. See Myrdal, Institutional Economics, 12 J. ECON. ISSUEs .771, 773-74 (1978).
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erally, with economic, social, and political stratification.9 7 Accordingly, they view the economic process as a dynamic, open system
forming a single component of the complex network of sociocultural relationships." Consequently, Institutionalists reject the notion that the economic system can be organized adequately
through markets and the unrestricted interaction of self-interests.9 9 According to the Institutionalists, then, the "emphasis in economics should be on the economy itself, as a socio-political, culturally conditioned entity from which society's economic choices
emerge." 100
As previously stated, Institutionalists are concerned with the
distribution of power in society. 10 1 Proponents of this theory are
preoccupied with power because conflict, rather than harmony,
constitutes the analytical point of departure for Institutionalism.1 0 '
Under this approach, the economist must necessarily give consideration to the circumstances under which conflicts are resolved:1 08
In the heartland of the advanced industrial economy, conflicts are
settled not by the operations of the forces of the competitive market
system, but, rather, by the exercise of economic power buttressed by
political and legal power. Power resides very largely in the large corporations and other private economic organizations, the state, and
the courts, which are involved in deciding how individuals and
groups are to share goods, services, claims, rights, and obligations. In
the opinion of the -institutionalist the scientific paradigms of the
neoclassical and Keynesian economists do not come to grips with the
conflict-power issue. "
Institutionalists, therefore, have a scientific paradigm in which the
conflict-power nexus is a central concern; they incorporate a "tridimensional approach to the study of the politico-juridico-economic
system that explains how the economic, political, and legal deci97. Id. at 774.
98. See Peterson, Institutionalism, Keynes, and the Real World, 16 NEB. J. EcON. &
Bus. 27, 29 (1977).
99. See id. at 29.
100. Klein, American Institutionalism:PrematureDeath, Permanent Resurrection, 12
J. EcoN. ISSUES 251, 263 (1978).
101. Myrdal, InstitutionalEconomics, 12 J. EcoN. IssuEs 771, 774 (1978).
102. See Gruchy, Law, Politics, and Institutional Economics, 7 J. ECON. Issu.s 623,
623 (1973).
103. See id. at 623.
104. Id. at 623.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol11/iss4/1

18

Sandoval: Judicial Decisions within the Framework of an Economic Structure.

.19801

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

sion-making processes are interrelated."' 105
2. Spheres of Influence. Although there is no simple Institutional "model" purporting to illustrate how the economy works,
there is what might be termed a "vision" or view of how things
interrelate in the economy.' 0e This "vision" consists, generally
speaking, of three spheres of influence that interlock with each
other and act, or react, against each other.
a. The Government Sphere. The first sphere of influence in the
Institutional model is that of government. The government sphere
has two major characteristics. The first characteristic is the division of this sphere into two components: politics and jurisprudence. Secondly, the government sphere, operating under a democratic system, is characterized by a lack of planning unlike the
Socialist systems.1 07 The political component of the sphere is "concerned with the allocation of scarce, valued items which are considered to be the proper concern of political units such as cities, counties, states, and the nation."10 8 The established authority of the
separate units of government constitutes the bases of political decision making. These governmental units are vested with the power
to require public compliance with the decisions concerning safety,
defense, transportation, education, health, and social welfare.'"
The judicial component of the sphere also makes decisions concerning the allocation of scarce and valuable items. The judicial
system, however, deals with conflicts about the claims and obligations arising in connection with valuable items distributed by the
political system. This component interprets legislative and constitutional norms, then applies these norms to individual claims and
obligations. 10 Further, the judicial component authoritatively
scrutinizes conflicts arising from these claims and obligations, then
provides enforceable remedies consistent with its interpretation of
105. Id. at 623.
106. See Peterson, Institutionalism, Keynes, and the Real World, 16 NEB. J. EcoN. &
Bus. 27, 30 (1977).
107. The only type of long range planning found in the government sphere of influence
is perhaps in the military.
108. Gruchy, Law, Politics, and the InstitutionalEconomics, 7 J. ECON. ISuEs 623, 626
(1973). See generally D. EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITIcAL ANALYSIS 50-57 (1965); D.
EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 129-34 (1953).
109. Gruchy, Law, Politics, and Institutional Economics, 7 J. EcON. ISSuES 623, 626
(1973).
110. See id. at 626.
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the Constitution and laws."'
The lack of planning characteristic of the government sphere is,
according to the Institutionalists, responsible for many of the current crises facing the nation. Allan G. Gruchy in Institutionalism,
Planning,and the Current Crisis,"2 sets forth a number of variables that call for national economic planning:
(1) [the] failure to deal successfully with large economic units and
the issue of economic and political power; (2) the . . . [problems]
over income distribution; (3) [the] . . . inability to cure unemployment without creating inflation;. . . (4) [the] ... failure to develop
an . . . [income] policy that can be added to fiscal and monetary
policy in the effort to achieve economic stability; . . . (6) the ...
inadequacy of Keynesian economics in the face of problems that
were not of major importance when [the theory] . . . was conceived
. . -problems
such as economic power, stagflation, dissatisfaction
with national income distribution, consumerism, worker alienation,
and environmental deterioration; . . . (8) the spreading belief that
economics is now at an impasse and that economists are at bay
Ila

Institutionalists view economic planning as almost essential in or-

der to raise the quality of life to the maximum, and to deal effec11 4
tively with current social and economic problems.
b. The Corporate Sphere. Interlocked with the government
sphere of influence is the corporate structure sphere.
This sector, which probably accounts for half of all output, is dominated by giant corporations (Galbraith estimates that some 2,000
form its core), serving both national and international markets. The
organizational structure is corporate and bureaucratic, dependent
upon a highly professional management. In terms of the dollar value
of their sales and assets, many of the corporate giants which dominate the economy's center rival in economic size and power most of
our states and many foreign nations."'B
111. See id. at 626.

112. Gruchy, Institutionalism, Planning, and the Current Crisis, 11 J. EcoN. IssUES
431, 431 (1977).
113. Id. at 431-32.
114. Id. at 431-32; see, e.g., A. GRUCHY, MODERN ECONomic THOUGHT 1-2 (1947);
Gruchy, Institutionalism, Planning,and the Current Crisis, 11 J. EcoN. IssUEs, 431, 437
(1977); Stanfield, Institutional Economics and the Crisis of Capitalism, 11 J. EcoN. IssUES
449, 449 (1977).
115. Peterson, CorporateConcentration, Small Business, and the Economy, 15 NEB. J.
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Large corporations are in many ways similar to a political unit.
These corporations are characterized by well-defined objectives, a
bureaucratic system, and the power to impose many of their decisions upon other organizations and individuals." 6 Because it is'so
similar to a political unit, the corporate structure is said to have
political, jurisprudential, and economic components. It is through
these components that the sphere operates, influences, and is influenced by government.
The influence this sphere is able to exert over the economy is
substantial. More significant, however, is the fact that only a few
corporations account for this vast power.
These giant corporations which dominate the economy's center are
but a tiny fraction of the nation's more than 11 million business
firms; yet they have latched firmly onto the levers of economic
power in our society. How and where we live, what we consume, and
even, perhaps, how we vote is strongly influenced (if not dominated)
by decisions and actions taken in the economy's corporate center." 7
Within the corporate sphere, therefore,' there is what might be
termed a "sub-sphere" composed of the smaller, less powerful business entities. In manufacturing, for example, "many small firms
are virtually satellites of corporate giants, existing either as suppliers of material inputs or as outlets for their products."" 8 This subsphere, influenced by government and giant corporations, is able to
exert only minimal influence over the economy.
To appreciate the magnitude of vast assets and capital possessed
by corporations, it is helpful to analyze one such as IT&T. In 1964
IT&T embarked on a major diversification through merger program. Between 1961 and 1968 it acquired fifty-two domestic and
fifty-five foreign corporations, with the domestic companies alone
holding combined assets of about 1.5 billion dollars. During 1969,
IT&T's board of directors approved twenty-two domestic and
eleven foreign acquisitions. The three largest-Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Grinnell Corporation, and Canteen Corpora-

ECON. & Bus. 25, 28 (1976).
116. Gruchy, Law, Politics, and Institutional Economics, 7 J. EcoN. Issuts 623, 625
(1973).
117. Peterson, CorporateConcentration,Small Business, and the Economy, 15 Ns. J.
EcON. & Bus. 25, 28 (1976).
118. Id. at 29.
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tion-added assets of over two billion dollars, which brought its
acquisition total for the decade to nearly four billion dollars. Moreover, it should be noted that part of each tax dollar spent on defense or space programs goes to IT&T, one of the nation's leading
defense contractors. It also maintains Washington's "Hot-Line" to
Moscow and mans the Air Force Distance Early Warning System
and the giant Ballistic Missile Early Warning System sites in
Greenland and Alaska. Unlike the government sphere of influence,
the corporate structure is premised on the idea of long range planning. Through long range planning corporations are able to acquire
knowledge and skill in developing and acquiring assets and capital.
c. The Consumer Sphere. Interlocking with the government
and corporate spheres in the Institutional model is the consumer
sphere, characterized by a single economic component. This sphere
lacks the coordination and cohesive self-interest necessary to have
any significant political clout or legal representation. As a consequence of concentrated economic power, consumers are manipulated so that instead of producing in response to demand the corporate sphere can create demands according to its own
calculations.1 19 Until the late 1960's, little effort was made to organize consumers for the protection of their own self-interest. In
the Institutional model, therefore, the consumer sphere is at the
mercy of the government's political and legal influence as well as
the corporate sphere's political, legal, and economic influence.
3. Interlocking Relationship of the Spheres of Influence. The
interlocking between the' government sphere and the corporate
sphere is considered the corporate government. The corporate government is defined in terms of the relationship existing between
government officials and corporate management. For example, with
its numerous foreign operations, IT&T is an important force in international economic affairs. Some IT&T employees are better
known in circles of international diplomacy than in business. They
have included such notables as former U.N. Secretary General
Trygve Lie as Director of IT&T-Norway, former Belgian Premier
Paul-Henry Spaak as Director of IT&T-Belgium, two members of
the British House of Lords, a member of the French National Assembly, and, in the United States, John A. McCone, former direc119. See Klein, American Institutionalism: Premature Death, Permanent ResurrecISSUES 251, 266 (1978).

tion, 12 J. ECON.
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tor of the CIA, and Eugene R. Black, a prominent figure in international economic and political circles.
The interlocking sphere of influence between the corporate
sphere and the consumer sphere is called the corporate market.
The corporate market is defined as a market system wherein the
largest corporations have expanded rather steadily their shares of
an ever-growing economy. Moreover, although the pursuit of profits is still a major goal, this pursuit often takes the modern corporation into both national and international political affairs. In
many instances, the power of the large corporation is grounded in
concentrated markets, in its conglomerate and multinational
makeup, and in its sheer size. These characteristics permit the
large conglomerate corporation to engage in strategies not open to
smaller firms. Included among these strategies are cross-subsidization and business reciprocity. Cross-subsidization involves the use
of resources from one line of business to expand, if necessary at a
loss, another product line. Relatively specialized firms have limited
opportunities and capacity to engage in cross-subsidization because
their resources come from a single line of business. Conglomerate
firms, on the other hand, operate in many product lines and thus
have both the opportunity and the capacity to engage in the practice. Business reciprocity involves the practice of buying from
those who can buy from you. It becomes a potentially harmful
competitive strategy when some firms in a market can make more
sales on this basis than others. A single-line corporation has relatively few opportunities to pursue the practice, whereas a conglomerate firm that buys and sells a large variety and volume of
products has the best opportunity to engage in reciprocal dealing.
The last interlocking system within the Institutionalist economic
model occurs between the government sphere of influence and the
consumer sphere. This interlock is called the government market, a
marketplace wherein the government provides goods and services
for the consumer. For example, the government provides social security insurance for the old-aged, as well as food stamps and unemployment payments to those members of society unable to help
themselves. Hence, the government is able to influence directly the
consumer market system by injecting money that would not otherwise enter that market. In this way government affects the prices
of goods and commodities and, ultimately, unemployment.
When all three spheres of influence interlock with each other, a
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center core, which is a part of each individual sphere, is created.
This central core is the fusion of the government, corporate, and
consumer spheres, and is regulated by legal, political, and economic decisions. According to the Institutionalist, this central core
forms the "conflict-power nexus" from which all economic analysis
must begin.
B. Institutional Economics and Changing Social Attitudes
Proponents of the Institutional theory contend a significant recent trend is exhibited by increasing concern with social interests
while private interests diminish. The concept that an individual is
entitled to own private property has been jeopardized by the increasing interdependency of human life accompanying the nation's
shifting economic and social priorities.1' 0 To Institutionalists the
economic process is but one component within a complex network
of sociocultural relationships.' 1 Any meaningful inquiry into economic processes, therefore, must include an analysis of such issues
as civil rights, discrimination, and environmental deterioration. Although not articulated in Institutionalist terms, some recent judicial decisions have recognized the evolving trend to some extent. In
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,12 for example, the
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a New York law
limiting voter eligibility in school district elections to persons owning or leasing taxable real property within the district.1 23 Reversing
the lower court's holding that the law was constitutional,1"' the
Court held that a standard of rigid examination is applicable to
statutes denying the voting franchise to citizens otherwise qualified
by residence and age.125 The Court pointed out that such a statute
would deny the right to vote to persons with distinct and direct
interests in school meeting decisions by drawing artificial lines inconsistent with the equal protection clause.1' 6 The significance of
120. See Gruchy, Law, Politics, and Institutional Economics, 7 J. EcoN. IssuEs 623,
624-25 (1973).
121. See Peterson, Institutionalism,Keynes, and the Real World, 16 N.B. J. EcON. &
Bus. 27, 29 (1977).
122. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
123. See id. at 623.
124. See id. at 633.
125. See id. at 626 (standard), 632-33 (standard applied).
126. See id. at 626-27, 632-33. The Court stated the following persons would be denied
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Kramer to an Institutionalist is its refusal to classify individuals
according to property interests. In other words, it divorces the concept of property rights from that of social rights and interests.
Trimble v. Gordon127 presents another case in which the Supreme Court focused on individual personal rights. At issue in this
case was an Illinois probate statute that extended the intestacy
rights of illegitimate children to inheritance from their mothers
only.' 28 The Court held the statute discriminated against illegitimates in violation of the equal protection clause.' 29 Although classifications based on illegitimacy are not "suspect" under the equal
protection clause, the Court reasoned a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny is justified because such classifications encroach on fundamental personal rights. 3 0 In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that the statute advanced a substantial state interest by
establishing an accurate and efficient method of disposing of property at death. "'
Notable developments, consistent with the Institutionalist
model, have also resulted in the area of gender-based discrimination. In Craig v.Boren, 3 2 for example, the Supreme Court announced -that classifications based on sex survive scrutiny under
the equal protection clause only if substantially related to the
achievement of important governmental objectives.' " For some
time Institutionalists have argued that if the "male economic monopoly" is to be broken, greater educational opportunities must be
established for women.' 3 4 They have taken the position that educational institutions must, for a period, discriminate affirmatively in
favor of women; to do otherwise, would implicitly perpetuate past
discrimination. 3 5 This position was given recognition in the recent
the right to vote notwithstanding a direct interest in school meeting decisions: persons living
with relatives; military personnel and others living on tax-exempt property; and parents
who neither own nor lease qualifying property and whose children are too young to attend
school. See id. at 630.
127. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
128. Id. at 762, 763.
129. See id. at 776.
130. See id. at 766-67. See generally Note, Equal Protection and the "Middle-Tier":
The Impact on Women and Illigitimates, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 303, 311-12 (1978).
131. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977).
132. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
133. Id. at 197, 199.

134. See J. GALBRAITH,

ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE

229-30 (1973).

135. See id. at 229-30.
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case of Califano v. Webster,"' in which the Court recognized that
reducing the financial disparity between men and women caused
by historical economic discrimination constitutes an important
government objective.3 7 Consequently, the Court held that benign
sex discrimination preferring women over men to ameliorate historical economic discrimination is constitutionally permissible.' "
Issues involving the environment present still another area of
deep concern for Institutional economists. In two important "environment" decisions, Sierra Club v. Morton'3 9 and United States v.
SCRAP," 0 the Supreme Court recognized that aesthetics "and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society.'4 The Court reasoned individuals could suffer recreational and aesthetic harm as a
consequence of environmental deterioration."' The combined result of these two cases was to reduce the barriers to litigation facing environmental groups." 8 E. L duPont DeNemours & Co. v.
Train,'" presents another significant environmental decision
under the Institutional economic model. In this case the Court sustained the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency to
impose industrywide, as opposed to plant-by-plant, limitations on
the discharge of water pollution." 5 The Court also held new plants
were barred from obtaining variances from the effluent limits
under the Federal Pollution Control Act."

Generally speaking, the Institutional theory states there is an interrelationship between political, legal, and economic functions in
society that should be considered in long range planning decisions
by government. Recognition of this interrelationship is particularly
important, according to the Institutionalist, in dealing with envi136. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
.137. See id. at 317, 320.
138. See id. at 317-18, 321.
139. 405 U.S. 727 (1977).
140. 412 U.S. 660 (1973).
141. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) (proposed skiing development
in national forest challenged as harmful to area's aesthetics and ecology); see United States
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (railroad surcharge challenged as causing wasteful depletion of natural resources and discouraging use of recyclable materials).
142. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
143. See C. STONE, SHOULD TuMEs HAvE STANDING? 21-22 (1974).
144. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
145. See id. at 131-33, 136.
146. See id.at 137-38.
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ronmental and energy problems. As a fundamental premise the
theory assumes a substantial power imbalance in the present economic structure. A balance of power can be achieved only by redistributing economic wealth through legal, political, and economic
vehicles. Institutionalists firmly believe their theory will become
more prevalent because a broader approach will be needed for
dealing effectively with the practical and political problems facing
the nation. 14 7 Conventional economics will be abandoned according
to the Institutionalists, because its scope is restricted to narrow
models encompassing a limited number of variables; it is thus limited to basic economic analysis only. 14 8 This is not to suggest that
Institutionalists reject the analytical tool kit of the classical economist; however, as Institutionalists, they are concerned with explaining various phenomena. Consequently, while the Classical
economist's view of the world is shaped by the mechanism and formalism of the physical sciences, the Institutionalist's perception is
shaped by history and evolutionary biology. Institutionalists cannot work with the classical, mechanistic human. Instead, they work
with the organic human, a member of a continuously evolving society. Their principal criticism of orthodox economics is that it
works with formalistic, mechanical, narrowly defined models.14' By
150
design, it is ignorant of "a whole world of relevant things."
V.

CONCLUSION

The interrelationship between legal and economic theory has
had a profound effect on legal, political, and economic decision
making. Because economic theories manifest social attitudes, many
legal and political decisions can be explained in terms of the economic theories prevalent in society. The New Deal era of the
1930's, for example, can be best understood by an examination of
the Keynesian economic philosophy. By the same token, the Great
Society of the 1960's reflected the Institutional economic influence
by drawing attention away from individuals as property owners,
and focusing instead on the individual as a person with economic
147. See Myrdal, InstitutionalEconomics, 12 J. EcoN. IsSuEs 771, 780 (1978).
148. Id. at 775.
149. See Dugger, Institutional and Neoclassical Economics Compared, 58 Soc. Sci.

449, 451-52 (1977).
150. Myrdal, Institutional Economics, 12 J. EcoN. IssuEs 771, 776 (1978).
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and social claims. It is no longer disputed that many of the public
issues facing the nation have serious economic implications. Because of this, it has become increasingly important for lawyers to
have at least a basic understanding of economic theory. By examining the interrelationship of law and economics, it may be possible to deduce the basic formal characteristics of the law from economic theory." 1

"151. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
393 (1972).
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